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Military history a century after the
Great War
L’histoire militaire un siècle après la Grande Guerre
William Philpott
1 The parameters and issues of British military history of the First World War were largely
set in the war’s immediate aftermath. By the 1930s soldiers and statesmen had argued the
pros and cons of Britain’s strategy of ‘continental commitment’ – raising a mass citizen
army to fight in France and Flanders alongside Britain’s French ally, rather than pursuing
a more traditional maritime strategy. Since the 1960s the men who went to war have been
studied by social and cultural historians, although how they made war has only recently
become a trend in historiography. The military conduct of the land campaigns, especially
that on the western front, was also subject to scrutiny before the archive were opened in
the 1960s, largely by popular historians.1 To a great extent by the 1980s Britain’s war
experience had become lost amid well-established cultural myths of the conflict:  Dan
Todman has examined the nature and import of such myths, of command incompetence,
mud, futility and mass death.2 Historians’ effort thereafter was focused on explaining the
practicalities of adapting the British army to the demands of modern warfare, and the
constraints upon British strategy. A century after the war British military history is only
now  starting  to  break  out  of  the  parochial  channels  steered  since  the  1930s.  The
constraints  of  coalition  war  and  comparative  studies  of  military  performance  are
emerging as the new historical paradigms for understanding the British experience of
warfare between 1914 and 1918. 
2 For several  decades military historians in Britain have been re-examining myths and
misperceptions about the British army’s effectiveness on the battlefield. This is a largely
monographic  literature,  which  has  yet  to  be  synthesised  into  a  narrative  of  British
military performance in the war. This historical revisionism began with the identification
and consideration of  the  concept  of  a  ‘learning  curve’  of  improving  British  military
performance from the army’s early and costly trench battles of 1915 and 1916, Loos and
the Somme, to the successful British advance and defeat of the German army in 1918.3
While the concept of  a learning curve is  now considered too simplistic,  studying the
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process by which the British army adapted to modern industrialised warfare has been the
predominant trend in Anglophone military history of the war since the 1990s. The focus
has been primarily on the western front,  and the period of trench warfare,  although
imperial forces and extra-European campaign have also been studied.4
3 An over-simplified, negative view of British military effectiveness in the First World War
emerged from the counter-cultural landscape of 1960s Britain. A lone voice, the journalist
John Terraine,  attempted to present the British army, and its leader Douglas Haig in
particular, in a more nuanced and favourable light by placing the army’s efforts firmly in
the context of the rapid and complex changes in warfare taking place between 1914 and
1918.5 While Terraine’s essentially popular history was limited in its source base and
range, it inspired scholars such as Paddy Griffith, Brian Bond, Peter Simkins and John
Bourne  to  look  again  at  the  British  army’s  military  practices  and  actions.6 Early
contributors from the Commonwealth set the parameters of the debate: the Canadian
historian Tim Travers suggested an army hidebound by Edwardian social conventions and
slow to adapt,  while the Australians Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson in their ground-
breaking study of General Sir Henry Rawlinson as a military commander suggested a
general and an army that adapted slowly and traumatically to the challenges presented
by the modern battlefield.7 British historians have been less harsh in their judgments.
Douglas  Haig  has  remained  the  focus  of  attention,  not  least  because  he  remains  a
misunderstood public hate figure despite repeated analysis both of his personality and
methods as a field commander. While far from faultless, both John Paul Harris and Gary
Sheffield have explained the army which Haig led and the problems of command that he
negotiated  with  greater  critical  balance.8 At  the  same  time,  broader  studies  of  the
command culture and practices of the British army, as well as biographical studies of its
leaders, have developed understating of it as a military institution.9 
4 In recent years the focus of scholarship has moved away from the men who ran the army
and towards the way the army operated. As well as Andy Simpson’s collective study of
Army  Corps  commanders  cited  above,  which  elaborated  the  key  level  of  operation
command  and  the  systems  with  which  the  army  worked  on  the  battlefield,  other
important  monographs  have investigated the  logistics  of  the  British  army and more
recently its communications and intelligence systems.10 Echoing a trend in the study of
armed  forces  more  generally,  the  most  recent  tendency,  which  has  yet  to  produce
definite  findings,  has  been  to  examine  the  processes  of  institutional  learning  and
adaptation that allowed the army to rise to the challenges of modern war. The outcomes
have been suggested in Jonathan Boff’s recent monograph on the British Third Army in
1918, which explains why the British army was able to defeat the German army on the
battlefield.11 Boff’s  highly  original  study using documentary sources  and quantitative
methods  not  only  applies  the  developing  understanding  of  the  British  army’s
effectiveness to a battlefield case study, but also pioneers a comparative methodology
that  aids  understanding  of  processes  and  outcomes  on  the  battlefield.  Boff’s  study
complements more sociological studies of the experience of the opposing armies such as
Alex Watson’s comparative study of British and German military morale.12 More focused
battle studies, such as this author’s multi-national study of the 1916 Somme offensive,
point the way forward towards a nuanced understanding of First World War warfare and
how the societies that waged it engaged with its challenges. A greater appreciation of the
impact  of  the home front  on processes  and outcomes on the battlefield needs to be
developed however, so that modern warfare can be seen in the round. 
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5 Strategy remains a field of investigation and growing consensus. The old (and largely
counter-factual) controversies set up by the war’s protagonists – between ‘easterners’ and
‘westerners’ essentially, over whether effort should have been concentrated on defeating
the German army on the western front or might have been more effectively employed in
other theatres – have been increasingly rejected as a useful framework for understanding
the complexities of Great War strategy. In two important volumes on strategic policy,
David  French  refocused  the  study  of  strategy  on  the  complex  relationship  between
government  departments  (and  their  ministers)  and  competing  demands  on  finite
resources, suggesting that strategy involved a great deal more than the movement of
armies and navies.13 How these department actually made war, however, remains unclear
and is developing as a subject for fuller investigation. Slipping back into the east versus
west  dialectic,  Brock Millman challenged French’s  conception that  a  push to  victory
determined strategy under Lloyd George’s leadership, suggesting instead that increasing
pessimism that the war could be won diverted the Prime Minster’s attention away from
beating German in the west  as  his  generals  always advocated towards defending the
British empire in the east after 1917.14 These interpretations, to which Nicholas Lambert
recently added a detailed study of the flawed strategy of ‘economic warfare’ in 1914 and
1915,  suggests  that  the components and objective of  wartime strategy are still  being
established.15
6 The most  fruitful  area of  strategic studies in recent years has been that  of  coalition
warfare.  Developing from earlier studies of ‘national’  strategy, recent scholarship has
demonstrated that Britain made war in alliance, and that Britain’s strategic choices were
constrained by the policies and needs of France, Russia, Italy and the United States, as
well as her own strategic imperative of holding the alliance together. Ranging from the
theme of coordination of military operations on the land fronts through wider questions
of resource coordination and allocation, finance and coalition management, such studies
have brought out more fully Britain’s place in a world war, and her role – important but
often subordinate – in the running of a military alliance.16 Surprisingly, in the field in
which Britain contributed most to the alliance, that of maritime strategy, there are as yet
no studies  that  bring out  the  coalition nature  of  the  naval  war  effort.  As  the  war’s
centenaries pass, more rounded views of allied strategy and war making should emerge.
7 Over recent decades historical understanding of the nature and practices of the British
army between 1914 and 1918 has  developed profoundly from the broad-based battle
studies that characterise traditional military history. Now the concepts and conclusion
from this transformation of our understanding of the military effectiveness of the British
army are starting to inform recent battle studies.17 Whether the achievements of British
armed  forced  in  the  First  World  War  will  now  be  publicly  acknowledged,  however,
remains to be seen. Anglophone scholars are now applying their methodology to other
armies. Robert Foley, Tim Gale and Jonathan Krause are making their names as experts on
the armies of Germany and France, in the absence of a strong academic military history
tradition in those countries’ universities.18 The history of armies and warfare remains a
strong trend in British First World War studies. The many recent monographs based on
doctoral research will be supplemented by further in-depth studies as the centenaries
pass.  All  this  points towards a trans-national  comparative approach based on British
methodologies as the way forward for developing knowledge and understanding of the
nations that went to war and the changing nature of warfare between 1914 and 1918.
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8 Even before the formal commemorations have begun, it is clear that the centenaries of
the  First  World  War  will  be  a  major public  event  in  Great  Britain,  one  with  which
profession historians must engage. A series of national and international commemorative
events has been announced by the British government, alongside a funded programme of
local community projects.19 The Imperial War Museum has taken on a coordinating role
for  public  commemoration,  and  has  just  launched  a  ‘Lives  of  the  First  World  War’
crowdsourcing project to identify the roles played by individuals during the conflict.20
This has the potential to refocus public understanding away from a prevailing obsession
with  the  trenches  and  towards  a  wider  understanding  of  the  national  community’s
engagement with the war, as well as its global scale and issues. The BBC has commenced a
four-year season of Great War related programming, even before the actual centenaries
are upon us.21 Other broadcasters are no doubt finalising their centenary output, while
publishers are printing and reprinting historical and literary works on First World War
themes.  The  war  certainly  remains  a  living  war  in  Britain  and  the  centenary
commemorations are starting with a bang. Whether public interests will be stimulated or
quickly satiated, and whether this generates light or merely heat remains to be seen. 
9 The centenaries represent a brilliant opportunity for historians of the war – never has a
series  of  familiar  yet  now increasingly distant  and alien events  had the potential  to
capture the public imagination, or to benefit from such prolonged exposure. With no
surviving  veterans  to  compel  society  along  narrow,  familiar  commemorative  paths,
moreover, this will be the historians’ centenary. Looking at the first wave of media-driven
history,  however,  the  opportunity for  presenting  up-to-date  knowledge  and
understanding has yet to come. The media frenzy began in late 2013, with new books on
the origins and early months of the war (plus a few on later aspects and on the war as
whole) and a wide range of original and repeated television and radio progammes: more
will follow through 2014 and afterwards. Already the centenaries are generating public
controversy.  The  government’s  programme  of  commemorative  events  has  provoked
criticism in the historical community, dwelling as it does on the familiar ‘tragic’ reference
points  of  the  war  –  August  1914,  Gallipoli,  the  Somme and Passchendaele  –  thereby
accentuating  the  negatives  rather  than  balancing  these  with  positives  such  as  the
impressive  series  of  military  victories  that  ended  the  war.  Other  communities  have
questioned why the war’s centenaries are being marked at all. One thing that historians
are emphasising is the parallels between the First World War and the supposedly ‘good’
Second  World  War  which  followed  it,  both  in  its  purpose  and  its  conduct.  Political
correctness, and an unwillingness to offend European partners, nevertheless threatens to
sublimate reengagement with the genuine issues over which the war was fought into a
Europe-wide ‘peace fest’ as commemoration becomes a trans-national activity. It remains
the historians’  role  to  explain the  issues  of  wartime in  the terms understood by its
protagonists and to resist the tyranny of modern sensibilities that may produce another
misreading of the conflict similar to that which developed from its fiftieth anniversaries. 
10 In Britain it is the big celebrity names who have had the first word – the journalist Max
Hastings  on  1914  and  the  broadcaster  Jeremy  Paxman  on  Britain’s  war,  with  the
inevitable TV series and book tie-in.22 Historians are not yet despairing of the media’s
approach to the commemorations, but they are also concerned about the place of serious
historical scholarship amid growing ‘infotainment’ about the war, and whether recent
insight  will  be  swamped  by  thoughtless  rehashing  of  discredited  interpretations  or
checked by a growing ‘war weariness’  in time.  From the BBC’s early programming it
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seems that radio and niche television channels will broadcast programmes with scholarly
content,  while mainstream channels will  dramatise historical  events such as the July
crisis  and offer  First  World  War  themed entertainment  such as  dramas  and literary
adaptations.
11 It is becoming clear that professional historians will not front the centenary presentation
of the war, and at best will operate only on its margins, as historical advisers and talking
heads.  But  they  will  be  active  behind  the  scenes  and  over  five  years  they  have  an
excellent opportunity to expand the range of interest and understanding of the war, and
to help to correct outdated or misconceived impressions. Scholars need to step out of the
lecture theatre and to engage with the public – new media and old give historians an
unprecedented opportunity to communicate. It is unlikely (although not impossible) that
recent reinterpretations of the war will prevail come 2018, although the presentation of
an  alternative  viewpoint  will  show  that  the  war  remains  a  contested  and  evolving
historical phenomenon. The historical landscape will be shaped for the next twenty-five
to fifty years:  it  will  look very different from that which was established in the days
before serious academic scholarship on the war,  which effectively commenced in the
1960s  after  British  national  archives  were  opened.  Scholarship  and  historiographical
debates have also broken out of the parameters established by the war generation. New
interpretations and original subjects will be brought to the public’s attention. The shock
troops of the British Commission for Military History, the International Society for First
World War Studies and other interested professional organisation are gearing up for five
years of sustained engagement with fellow scholars, leaders, teachers and the public.23 If
professional  historians  can  look  beyond  the  trenches,  present  the  issues  of  1914–18
clearly and cogently, and explain the nature and impact of warfare on home and fighting
fronts  we will  have established the war as  a  determining historical  event,  while  not
denying its significance as a cultural phenomenon whose memory and history shifts with
each  generation’s  reengagement  with  the  conflict  and  its  outcomes.  If  we  move
understanding of the war out of the trenches and towards a rounded picture of societies
waging modern war for global stakes, then historians will have achieved something from
the centenaries. 
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